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BEING HONEST ABOUT BEING HONEST AGENTS
GUIDO CALABRESI*
Let me begin by saying that I am completely in favor of the
proposition as stated: that judges should be the honest agents of
the enacting legislature. In saying this, I first want to make a dis-
tinction between interpretation and construction. Construction is
not the same thing as interpretation. Historically in our judicial
system, judges have had the power to construe. Whether they
should have such power and whether they should only use that
power when it is delegated to them by the legislature are inter-
esting and difficult questions.
I. CONSTRUCTION
Let us look at some situations where, traditionally, construc-
tion has been employed.
A. Constructing Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Questions
Judges have historically used construction to avoid constitu-
tional questions and thus to avoid over-constitutionalizing the
law.. Doing this is not interpretation because it does not look
primarily to the legislature. It is dishonest to call that kind of
construction interpretation. And yet it has been done.
B. To Require a Second Look
Throughout the nineteenth century, statutes in derogation of
the common law were supposedly read "literally." In fact this
did not mean a literal reading, but rather one that made the
statute consistent with the prior common law.^  That was not
interpretation. It was mangling statutes so that legislatures
would not make radical changes in the law. It stopped happen-
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ing at the end of the nineteenth century because Roscoe Pound
and the Left noticed that judges, who by nature are conserva-
tive, used the approach to keep things as they were, and at-
tacked it.^  Was this type of construction good? I do not know,
but it was done.
C. To Update
Updating obsolete statutes is much more problematic. But
consider an analogous approach espoused by Robert Bork. In
his great work on antitrust,^ which was influenced by Alexan-
der Bickel, Bork acknowledged the incompatible goals, fre-
quently ascribed to the antitrust laws, of protecting both com-
petition and competitors.* Although he ultimately concluded
that "[t]he Sherman Act was clearly presented and debated as a
consumer welfare prescription," he did concede that in passing
subsequent antitrust legislation, "Congress mentioned a variety
of values besides consumer welfare and apparently never rec-
ognized or discussed the possibility of a conflict of values."^
Perhaps foreseeing the forthcoming wave of criticism regarding
his reading of legislative intent as focused on consumer welfare,*
Bork acknowledged that the goals of antitrust policy are not "de-
termined entirely by the intentions of Congress"^ and proposed
an "equally important... independent, and usually over-
looked . . . factor: the responsibility of the courts for the integrity
of the law and the lawmaking process."* Bork concluded that
"the requirements of proper judicial behavior," among other
things, support the case for "judicial adherence to the single goal
of consumer welfare in the interpretation of antitrust laws."'
And from that followed all of his great work on antitrust.
Was Bork's idea that consideration of "the responsibility of
courts for the integrity of the law" should influence judicial
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construction of the antitrust statutes a good one? I am not sure.
But if judges are to take such considerations into account, it is
worth thinking about whether, in those situations, one wants
judges to acknowledge what they are doing.
Brother Easterbrook says that it is insane to give that kind of
power to people who cannot be turned out of office.^ " It may be
insane, but it happened at the beginning of our country, in
every single state. What do I mean? Judges have the power to
construe the common law. Everyone knows that. The common
law is different. But where did judges get that power? The
common law of England did not just come over on its own.
When we declared independence, there was no common law of
the United States. Every one of the states, some by legislation,
some, like New York," in their constitutions, enacted the com-
mon law of England and delegated to the courts the power to
update it according to common law methods.^^
In other words, the whole of the common law in the United
States is statutory. It is enacted by statute with powers delegated
to the courts. Courts—unelected as well as elected ones—were
given the power, using the common law method, to construe the
common law, to update it, to do all the things that law students
in their first-term torts classes and contract classes leam that
courts do. Now again, does that mean that courts can do the
same as to statutes for which they have not been delegated that
power? No. I am only saying that delegating that power, in
some circumstances, is not insane, nor is it unconstitutional."
11. INTERPRETATION
Let us shift from construction, which may or may not be al-
lowed but which should not be excluded without thought, to
interpretation.
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A. Context
Interpretation, in my view, should always be backwards
looking. Interpretation requires one to be an honest agent.
Judges are interpreters of the enacting legislature. A judge
should try to find what the legislators intended, but that is of-
ten impossible. Just saying this points out the difficulty of the
task because there are any number of different things legisla-
tors said and did not say.
If it is often impossible to know the intent of the legislators,
what does it mean to be an honest agent? One starts with lan-
guage, but language is itself meaningless outside of context.
We do not need Wittgenstein to tell us that.^ *
There are people like the critical legal theorists,^^ Q^¿ people
like Judge Richard Posner—who is simply a critical legal theo-
rist of the Right^^—who say that courts can do anything they
want because language does not tell us anything. That is non-
sense. Language is important; it limits courts a great deal. To
say either that language does not mean anything, or that it
tells us exactly what everything means, is baloney. The truth
lies somewhere in between. Text means language in context.
I once convinced a judge in a tax case (she happened to be a
great, great bridge player, and she also loved to play touch
football) that the phrase, "you should have passed, dummy,"
means something rather different at the bridge table than at
halftime in the Super Bow l^. By that I meant that judges have to
read statutes in the context in which they were enacted.
Language is helpful, but language can also be misleading be-
cause it changes in meaning. The word "substance"—as in,
something is of substance—originally meant that which lay be-
neath—swbstflntzfl.^ ^ It meant spirit. It came to mean that which is
important, because spirit was important. As we became more ma-
14. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 51 (C.K.
Ogden trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1981) (1922).
15. See, e.g., Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127,
187-88 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpreta-
tion of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179,187 (1984) (arguing
that "there is no such thing as deduction from a text" and that even seemingly
clear text must always be interpreted).
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terialistic, it came to mean matter or that which matters.^^ Today,
"substance" means the opposite of what it originally meant.
What do you do with language that changes its meaning? For
this reason too we must look at text first, but also look at context.
What of legislative history? We all know that legislative his-
tory can be fraudulent. That is one of the many things that Jus-
tice Scalia has taught us.^ ^ But that does not mean it is useless.
To what does one look if one wants to find out what a legislature
really intended? I am immensely skepfical of legislative history. I
am also immensely skeptical of some of the words that get
thrown into the statutory text. I start with words, I look at con-
text, and I try to see w h^at the words were designed to mean.
And this, by tihe way, has been the way judges and scholars have
described the process from the earliest days of our legal system.
Samuel von Puffendorf gave an example that William Black-
stone^o—the single greatest influence on our Framers—picked
up, and that has been cited over the centuries.^' In Bologna,
there were many brawls and duels. Bologna passed a statute
that said: You shall not shed blood on the streets, punishable
by hanging, drawing and quartering, or other such things.
Now imagine Judge Easterbrook walks down the street of Bo-
logna and collapses. The good Dr. Giovanni Manning comes
by, and according to proper medical pracfice of the time, bleeds
him. There is blood in the street. Meyer the Gop arrests the doc-
tor and says, "you shall not shed blood on the streets." The
courts in Bologna are said to have held such an arrest to be in-
valid because that was not what "shedding blood on the
streets" meant. It was not the "mischief" (a word English
courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries commonly
used when interpreting statutory text) to which the statute was
addressed.22
What happens if the legislators that had enacted the statute
had not thought about the issue before the court? It is difficult to
say what they would have done had they thought about it.
Sometimes one has a pretty good idea; sometimes one does not.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565 (9th ed. 2009).
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And as always, honesty is crucial. But it gets even more compli-
cated. There are some people who say it is not just what they
would have done at the time had they thought about it. Rather,
it is what people who thought about things as the legislators did
would have done about it had they thought about the issue in
terms of today's society.^ ^ So, it does not really matter that Lin-
coln gave segregationist speeches because if one views Lincoln
in the context of his society, and then asks what he meant or
would mean in today's society, the answer is that he would have
been an integrationist. This methodology is appealing because it
may well tell us something about what a law actually was in-
tended to do at the time it was enacted. But it is a problem be-
cause it is putting Lincoln in a Speedo, or Washington in cut-off
jeans. How far can one go with Üiat? AU of these methodologies
have problems.
B. Honesty
The ultimate question is whether judges are going to be hon-
est agents when interpreting statutes. Honesty is the beginning
and the end. Judges can be dishonest with language. But judges
can be dishonest with any of these methodologies. Given that
judges may well be dangerous and not to be trusted, what
should one do? Although if I were a conservative (and I think I
am), I, on the whole, would trust judges more than legislators
to be conservative in the true sense of the w^ord. Compare the
conservative tradition of believing judges capable of being
honest, which is Burke,^ * Bork,^ ^ and Bickel,^ ^ with the radical
reformer Bentham,27 who trusted only legislators.^^
23. See SCALIA, supra note 19, at 22 (arguing that judges should not interpret stat-
utes in light of what they ought to mean today).
24. See ALEXANDER M. BiCKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 25-26 (1975) (de-
scribing Burke's views).
25. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 251-69 (1990).
26. See ALEXANDER M. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
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27. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 13,14 n.l (Clarendon Press 1907) (1789).
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the world by suggesting that judges, who are almost always from the right, might
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Judges ought to try to do these things honestly. The alterna-
tive is to do what Judge Easterbrook argues for,^ ^ which
amounts to tying oneself to something that has no particular
meaning because one does not trust anybody. A good analogy
is the use of the gold standard as a monetary policy. The gold
standard has caused the worst inflations and the worst depres-
sions in history. It does, however, have the advantage that it is
mindless. Does this make it more desirable than a monetary
policy that attempts to determine the money supply according
to the state of the economy? Those who do not trust human be-
ings at all prefer a mindless standard like the gold standard.
They reason that, bad as it is, it is less bad than giving control
of the money supply to people who do their best to be honest
but may fail.
Tying oneself simply to words—which change their mean-
ing, which do not have meaning out of context, and which ul-
timately have nothing to say by themselves—as necessarily be-
ing what the enacting legislature actually meant, is tying
oneself to a gold standard. Such an approach has little to do
with trying to determine legislative intent. It has little to do
with being "honest agents." And there is an additional problem
with this kind of literalism. Because words can be manipulated
by judges, tying oneself to words may be like adopting a gold
standard when only a few people own all the gold mines. It is
giving power to judges who can say, "these words mean this,"
simply because they are willing to be dishonest and want a
particular result. A willful judge can just as easily say "X
means Y" as say what Lincoln in cut-off jeans or in a Speedo
would have intended.
29. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 916.
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